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Increasing the value of the company, followed by increasing the company's share price 
would provide the advantage of capital gains for investors. This shows the level of investor 
confidence in a company to manage their funds will affect the company's stock price 
movement of capital market, because buying stocks is to instill confidence in the 
management of a company to manage their funds. The objective of this research is 
determinants of firm value in banking companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange are 
Examined context with reference to firm value theories. The population consists of 22 
banks. The period under study is from 2007 to 2012 the data are taken from the banks' 
annual reports. In this study using panel data and analysis using pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS). The results are ROA and Log Asset have no effect on banks value. 
Managerial ownership negative effect on banks value. The results of the study do not 
support agency theory to minimize the agency conflict is to increase managerial ownership 
in the company. Investment opportunity positive effect on banks value 
 




Increasing the value of the company, followed by increasing the company's stock price will 
provide the advantage of capital gains for investors. This shows the level of investor 
confidence in a company to manage their funds will affect the company's stock price 
movement of capital markets, as buying stocks is to instill confidence in the management 




Implementation of the principles of good corporate governance will be more effective if 
carried out by the independent board, so as to reflect that the company is well managed and 
transparent. Many countries have strengthened recommendations on board composition 
and independence (Aguilera, 2005; Huse, 2005). As amatter of fact, a recent study shows 
that nowadays the independence of non-executive directors is a commonly recommended 
governance practice (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). However, in banking researches, the 
results regarding the effectiveness of outside directors aremixed. Some empirical 
researches in the last decades show no significant relationship between board composition, 
considered as the proportion of outsiders or of independent board members onthe board, 
and banks performance (Romano et al., 2012; Adams and Mehran, 2008; Love and 
Rachinsky, 2007; Zulkafli and Samad, 2007; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Simpson and 
Gleason,1999; Pi and Timme, 1993). 
 
Ownership of the company is one of the ways that can be used so that managers perform 
activities in accordance with the interests of the owner of the company. According to 
agency theory, the separation between ownership and management of the company can 
lead to conflict. The impact of this agency problem is the emergence of distrust of 
investors and shareholders for management's ability to manage the company to generate 
profits for investors. Distrust of shareholders against the management will reduce the value 




Investment opportunity set (IOS) in a company can determine whether a company will be 
able or not able to make a profit. IOS high indicates that the company is also investing in 
the future high, so investors interested in investing and impact on rising stock prices. 
Higher stock prices will boost the company's value of investors. 
The study will to fill this gap by determining which factors have significant effect on firm 
value decision of banking sector of Indonesia during 2007 to 2012.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Board composition is a debated corporate governance issue since it could influence board 
deliberations and the capability to control top management decisions and results. Although 
there is not an optimal formula (Vance, 1978), board independence has became a relevant 
issue in the corporate governance agenda. As a matter of fact, non-executive and 
independent directors are considered one of the most important mechanisms for ensuring 
corporate accountability (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998). 
 
A number of studies in the past, which aimed at establishing the effect of outside directors 
on the success or failure of firms, have examined the board composition and its impact on 
firm performance (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein 1994; Beasley 1996; Byrd & Hickman 
1992; Daily & Dalton 1992; Fosberg 1989; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; Schellenger, 
Wood & Tashakori 1989). However, empirical evidence on outside independent directors 
and firm performance is mixed, as there are some studies which found a majority of 
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outside independent directors improved performance (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein 1994; 
Daily & Dalton 1992; Schellenger, Wood & Tashakori 1989),  
 
He et al. (2009) state that board independence is the most effective deterrent of fraudulent 
financial reporting. As a matter of fact, many studies (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996; 
Beasley et al., 2000; Song and Windram, 2004; Uzun et al., 2004; Farber, 2005) showed 
that firms committing financial reporting fraud are more likely to have a board of directors 
dominated by insiders. With reference to Italy, Romano and Guerrini (2012) find that the 
higher the percentage of independent directors on the board, the lower the likelihood of 
financial fraud, arguing that a higher relative weight of independent directors appears to 
ensure more effective control. 
 
However, the majority of the existing studies about banks shows a significantly positive 
relationship between board composition and banks’ profitability or efficiency, highlighting 
how banks with a higher presence of non-executives or independent members in their 
boards perform better than the others (Shelash Al-Hawary, 2011; Trabelsi, 2010; De 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Tanna et al., 2008; Bino and Tomar, 2007; Busta, 2007; 
Pathan et al., 2007; Staikouras et al., 2007; Sierra et al., 2006; Isik and Hassan, 2002). 
Moreover, Brewer et al. (2000) find that the bid premiums offered for target banks increase 
with the proportion of independent outside directors. 
 
Our last group of variables consists of variables related to director interlocks and CEO and 
director compensation. Hallock (1997) argues that interlocks may be representative of a 
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dual agency problem. On the other hand, authors in the organizational literature arguethat 
interlocks are beneficial since they may reduce the information uncertainty created 
byresource dependence amongst firms (e.g. Pettigrew, 1992). While the predicted sign of 
the correlation between performance and interlocks is unclear, it is plausible that a 
correlation exists. There is also a vast literature that argues that the percentage of CEO 
ownerships correlated with Tobin’s Q (e.g. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990). Some studies have found a positive relation between CEO shareholdings 
and both Tobin’s Q and ROA (e.g. Mehran, 1995).  
 
The size of a company measured by market capitalization represents the total value of a 
company. Market capitalization is a market estimate of the value of a company, based on 
perceived future prospects, and economic and monetary conditions. It is calculated by 
multiplying the current price per share by the total number of outstanding shares. Investor 
confidence is reflected in the market capitalization.  
 
Investment in companies with higher market capitalization has lower risk compared to the 
firms with lower market capitalizations, because shares of firms with higher market 
capitalization are more liquid. Alternatively firms with lower market capitalization may be 
profitable due to a higher growth potential. The risk factor attached to shares of companies 
with lower market capitalization may be high, even though they have higher financial 
returns (Rashid 2007). Prior empirical studies find that firm performance is positively 





The population consists of 102 banks which are 5 government banks, 71 private banks and 
26 community development banks. The sample consists of 22 banks in Indonesia stock 
Exchange (IDX). The period of this study is from 2007 to 2012. The data are taken from 
banks’ annual reports. In this study using panel data and using pooled ordinary least square 
(OLS), random effect and fixed effect analysis. The following model is estimated: 
 
Y= a + b1X1 + b2X2+b3X3+ b4X4+ b5X5+ + eit  
Where 
Y  = Banks Value 
X1  = The proportion of independent board 
X2  =  Managerial ownership 
X3  =  Market to book value of equity(Investment opportunity) 
X4  =  Return on Assets (ROA) 
X5  =  Log Assets 
eit : error term of bank i in period t.  
 
 











TobinsQ 1.0000      
independent 
board  
0.0048    1.0000     
Managerial 
ownership  
-0.0325    0.0790    1.0000    
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IOS 0.8861   -0.0377    0.0598    1.0000   
LN asseta 0.4035    0.1351   -0.2840    0.4017    1.0000  
ROA 0.1446    0.2953   -0.0336    0.1004    0.1048    1.0000 
 
Table 1 provides information on the degree of correlation between the explanatory 
variables used in the multivariate regression analysis. The matrix shows that in general the 
correlation between the variable that are used in the analysis is not strong suggesting that 
multicollinearity problem are either not severe or non-existent. Kennedy (2008) and 
Gujarati (2009) points out that multicollinearity is a problem when the correlation is above 
0.8, which is not the case here. To ensure that there is no problem of multicollinearity, 
variance inflation factor (VIF) are estimated and since the results show that the VIF are 
below 10.  
 
The results showed that the variable data processing managerial ownership and investment 
opportunities affect the bank values, while independent board has no effect on the bank 
values. This is due to that the banking activity is closely monitored by the Bank of 
Indonesia so that the director cannot make policy contradicts with Bank Indonesia 
regulation. The results of the study consist by Fosberg 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach 




Regression with Random Effect and Fixed Effect  
Dependent Variable: Tobin’Q 
 
Variable Random Effect Fixed Effect  





.0035145    0.930 
 
 





-.0007594    0.130 
     
-.0012953     0.084 
     
Investment 
opportunity  
.0753711    0.000 
      
.070587    0.000 
      
LN Assets .0027049    0.589     -.0134021     0.400     
ROA .0009728    0.427     .0007654    0.545     
Constant .9006295    0.000      1.190636    0.000      
     
R-squared 0.7955  0.7540  
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  
Number 
observation 




The negative and significant coefficient on managerial ownership is somewhat surprising 
given that previous papers find no relation between ownership and Tobin’s Q (see 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Palia, 2001). The results of this study indicate that 
managerial ownership can decrease the value of the company as the manager's decision to 
have a large stock can be detrimental to the bank. Thus the market is responding negatively 
to the stake in the bank manager. 
 
The results of the study do not support agency theory to minimize the agency conflict is to 
increase managerial ownership in the company. Managerial ownership is believed to 
influence the course of the company to achieve its goals, which maximize the value of the 
company. Ownership in the company managers make managers work hard. If managers do 
not manage the company well, then the company will not achieve its objectives so that the 
lower the value of the company. Conversely, if the managers manage the company well, 
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then the value of the company will increase which means it will provide benefits for 
shareholders and corporate managers. With the managerial ownership, managers 
participate directly feel the benefits of the decisions taken and were also bear the loss as a 
consequence of making the wrong decision. 
The results showed that the investment opportunity (IOS) was significantly positively on 
firm value. These results together with the Yarmack 1996), Hasnawati (2005). This shows 
that the investment decision is important, because in order to achieve the company's 
objectives will only be generated through investment activities of the company. IOS has a 
very important role for the company, because IOS is an investment decision in the form of 
a combination of owned assets and investment options that will come, where the IOS will 




The population consists of 102 banks which are 5 government banks, 71 private banks and 
26 community development banks. The sample consists of 22 banks in Indonesia stock 
Exchange (IDX). The period of this study is from 2007 to 2012. Our study uncovers 
interesting results. We find that the results showed that the variable data processing 
managerial ownership and investment opportunities affect the bank values, while 
independent board has no effect on the bank values. This is due to that the banking activity 
is closely monitored by the Bank of Indonesia so that the director cannot make policy 
contradicts with Bank Indonesia regulation. Managerial ownership can decrease the value 
of the company as the manager's decision to have a large stock can be detrimental to the 
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bank. Thus the market is responding negatively to the stake in the bank manager. The 
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